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MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS, AND SOME EXPLANATIONS OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT, FAIR WAGES AND FAIR PRICES IN A GENERAL 
EQUILIBRIUM SETTING 
 




This paper argues that monetary policy matters in short-run and that it affects unemployment, 
and prices and wages in near-rational firms. Those profit-maximizer firms are adjusting prices 
in accordance with consumer expectations and wages are set to be fair accordingly to the 
workers expectations. This is in exercise is all happening in New Keynesian dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium setting which shall be compared to a Real business cycle model with 
technology shocks.  
 




John Maynard Keynes in his The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), 
in Book I:Chapter 3 Principles of the effective demand asserted that:” … volume of employment 
in equilibrium depends on (i) the aggregate supply function, , (ii) the propensity to consume,  
and (iii) the volume of investment… This is the essence of the General Theory of Employment”. 
In this system aggregate supply function is the sum of “the amount which the community is 
expected to spend on consumption” and “the amount which it is expected to devote to new 
investment” or “..”is what we have called above the effective demand”. Then Keynes argued 
that capitalist economy could poses equilibria that are characterized by the persistent 
involuntary unemployment, see also, Akerlof,Yellen (1987).Keynes analyzed that the key 
departure from the self-interested maximizing behavior is the assumed stickiness of money 
wages. Workers typically resists money wage reduction but..”..not to resist real money wage 
reductions”. Next, monetary policy can have large and long-lasting effect on interest rates and 
activity. A large literature based on Taylor (1979)-Calvo (1983) foundations, asserted that 
money growth (change) has a maximum effect on activity after one year, and that effect is gone 
in 3 years. Taylor-Calvo equations are capturing staggering and price decisions and are the basis 
modeling nominal rigidity in New Keynesian DSGE models. Monetary policy affects actual 
and natural rate of unemployment. Diamond (1982) model implied that there may be continuum 
of natural rates which may not be efficient, and it is in fact coordination failure. Hysteresis also 
is one channel through which monetary policy by inducing for sufficiently long period high 
interest rates can lead to increase in natural rate, see Blanchard, Summers (1986). The notion 
of unemployment whether is mismatch the central bank actions could be misguide and if it is a 
business cycle related FED “...could act to reduce it without touching of inflation”, wrote 
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Diamond (2011) in his column. Now in the case of matching, early search theory assumed the 
existence of a distribution of wage offers for identical jobs; unemployment arose in equilibrium 
because workers rejected low-wage jobs. This aspect of the theory was criticized both on logical 
grounds by Rothschild (1973) and on empirical grounds by Tobin (1972)1; Barron (1975)2. 
Rothschild (1973), asserted that the models of Mortensen (1970a,1970b) and Phelps 
(1970),while they do attempt to explain the behavior of the both sides of the labor market, they 
do not explain variety of wage offers which motivate the job seekers. One equilibrium model 
that met Rothschild’s criticisms, was first presented by Lucas and Prescott (1974). Early 
applications of the concept of the matching function that downplay the role of reservation wages 
include Hall (1979), Pissarides (1979), and Bowden (1980). Diamond and Maskin (1979) used 
the similar concept of “search technology” in a related context. The application of zero-profit 
conditions for new jobs, leading to a closed model with endogenous demand for labor, was first 
discussed in Pissarides (1979, 1984)3.Modern macroeconomics is being divided by primarily 
two schools of thought: Real Business Cycle theory that follows classical tradition, for which 
expansions and recessions are efficient response the technological state of the economy, and 
New Keynesian  economics which states that economies are prone to market failures, and that 
government could have a role in improving these market conditions, see Celso J. Costa (2016). 
Imperfect competition is at the heart of the New Keynesian model and this model primarily was 
developed by: Rotemberg (1982), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1997). In this sense Akerlof (1970), pointed out that a host of market imperfection phenomena 
best understood as response to imperfect and asymmetric information. model includes labor 
disutility. But it also does include unlike RBC model: new Keynesian Philips Curve, forward 
term, substitutability/mark-up on prices, Monetary Policy Smoothing Parameter, Monetary 
Policy GDP Growth target, and monetary policy inflation target. Fair pricing and fair wages 
also were included in the theoretical part of this paper. Rotemberg (2005) developed the first 
theory of price rigidity based on fairness considerations, but he was using the social-preference 
approach by: Rabin (1993) and Fehr,Schmidt (1999).In the fair pricing model that is explained 
in this paper, that is a model by Eyster, Madarsz, Michaillat (2019),consumers fail to savor 
unfairly priced goods, they are not demanding those products irrespective whether it harms the 
firm. So this paper is organized as follows: First Monetary policy effectiveness is explained in 
the model of Akerlof (1985), then we proceed to explain equilibrium Unemployment, then we 
proceed to explain social norms model and unemployment as consequence, Akerlof (1980) 
model, and model of fair wages or Akerlof (1982) model. Then we move to Eyster, Madarsz, 
Michaillat (2019) model of fair pricing in Monopoly model and New Keynesian setting. Then 
finally we move into explaining whole this system as a whole in a Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrum framework in MATLAB by using a code written by Gauthier Vermandel and 
published on his research page. These models are all about “macroeconomists’ adherence to 
                                                          
1 Tobin (1972) asserted that the now job seeking theory of Phelps et.al. (1970), is useful in explaining the voluntary 
frictional unemployment. But in the Beveridge curve reality –“vacancies should not be less than unemployment.  
But because of limited capital stocks and interdependence among skills, jobs cannot be indefinitely multiplied 
without lowering their marginal productivity”. ..”Our wise and benevolent planner would not place people in jobs 
yielding less than the marginal value of leisure. Given this constraint on the number of jobs, he would always have 
to keep some workers waiting, and some jobs vacant”..wrote Tobin (1972) acknowledging that there must be 
involuntary unemployed workers.   
2 Barron (1975) wrote:” It becomes clear that the expected duration of unemployment entails more than a 
comparison of an acceptance wage and the wage offer distribution”. He pointed out that papers such as Mortensen 
(1970a), “assumed a constant probability of receiving a wage offer each period”. 
3 Despite its importance there are very few attempts to derive the matching function from primitive assumptions 
that labor market is a place of trade .Hall (1979), Pissarides (1979), and Blanchard and Diamond (1994) have 
borrowed Butters’s (1976) urn problem (probability picking a ball from an urn) game to derive an exponential 
function. 
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one-deviation-at-a-timism, and their antipathy to multiple beauty-contest equilibria”, Akerlof 
(2019).  
1. Monetary policy effectiveness 










)   > 1 
Where: 𝑋-output of the firm; 𝑝-price of the firm of the output,  ?̅?-the average price level , 𝑀-
the money supply per firm. > 1 so that each firm has increasing revenue as price falls ?̅?𝑋 =
𝑀. In long run previous expression holds. Production function by which firms produce output 
is given as:  
Equation 2 
𝑋 = (𝑒𝑁)𝛼; 0 < 𝛼 < 1  
Where 𝑒-effort ; 𝑁-numbers of laborers hired .Relationship between effort and laborers is 
given as : 𝑒𝑁 = 𝑋
1





    ;  𝑒 = 𝑒(𝑤).Here 𝑒(𝑤) is assumed to be a function like 
:𝑒(𝑤) = −𝑎 + 𝑏𝑤𝛾;  0 < 𝛾 < 1, 𝑎 > 0; 𝑏 > 0. Profits of the firms are equal to: 
Equation 3 





















  ?̅? 
Equilibrium condition at the initial price 𝑃0 is given as : 𝑝𝑜 = 𝑘?̅?0. In the previous equation: 









Where 𝑤∗-optimal level of wage (Solow wage elasticity of effort with respect to wage is unity 
and represents the condition by which firm chooses the real wage that minimizes the unit cost 
of labor efficiency unit). The demand for labor now is: 𝑁0 =
𝑘1−𝛼
𝑒(𝑤∗)
 .Total supply of labor  ?̅?  
now exceeds the total demand for labor. In this case there will be unemployment, so the firm 
will be able to obtain all the labor that is needed by the preferred wage rate 𝑤∗.Money supply 
changes by a fraction 𝜖    
Equation 5 
𝑀 = 𝑀0(1 + 𝜖) 
𝑚-firms are short maximizers and set prices of their output and wage at the levels that exactly 
maximize profits on the assumption that the average price level is unaffected by their 
decisions. The 𝑛-firms which continue a rule of thumb, continue to charge the same price of 
output and to pay the same wage. Money wages are sticky over business cycles, and also that 
prices are constant markup over normal average unit costs. Now the key endogenous variables 
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Table 1 Key endogenous variables in near-ration model of Akerlof (1985) 
Endogenous Variable Explanation 
𝑝𝑛 = 𝑝0 
 
This is by assumption that 𝑝𝑛 = 𝑝0 , this is the prices 
charged by non-maximizing firms (n). 
𝑤𝑚 = 𝑤∗ 
 
This comes from setting the derivative of the profit 
function 1,with respect to 𝑤 equal to zero, that 
yields the elasticity of effort with respect to the real 
wage 𝑤𝑚 be unity. In equilibrium  𝑤𝑚 = 𝑤∗ 
𝑝𝑚 = 𝑝0(1 + 𝜖)
𝜃  here 2 
 
This comes from setting the derivative of the profit 
function with respect to 𝑝𝑚 equal to zero. And 
setting   𝑀 = ?̅?0(1 + 𝜖)  and this yields  
 𝑝𝑚 = 𝑝0(1 + 𝜖)
𝜃 This follows by definition  ?̅? =
(𝑝𝑛)𝛽(𝑝𝑚)1−𝛽 geometric mean of prices and 𝑝𝑛 =
𝑝0 ,which form money supply previously set yields: 
𝑝𝑚 = 𝑝0(1 + 𝜖)
𝜃,this is price charged by the 
maximizing firms (m). 
?̅? = 𝑝0(1 + 𝜖)
(1−𝛽)𝜃 
 
This follows directly from the definition:  
 ?̅? = (𝑝𝑛)𝛽(𝑝𝑚)1−𝛽 also 𝑝𝑛 = 𝑝0 and 
 𝑝𝑚 = 𝑝0(1 + 𝜖)
𝜃, 
𝑤𝑛 = 𝑤∗(1 + 𝜖)−(1−𝛽)𝜃 
 
The money wage paid by the non-maximizing firm 










Source: Akerlof (1985)  












𝑔(𝜖) and 𝑓(𝜖) unimportant can be calculated explicitly by substituting ?̅? = 𝑝0(1 + 𝜖)
(1−𝛽)𝜃 
and 𝑀 = 𝑀0(1 + 𝜖) for  ?̅?  and 𝑀 in the profit function. Similarly, ℎ(𝑒) equals to :  ℎ(𝜖) =
(1 + 𝜖)−(1−𝛽)𝜃 since : 𝑤𝑛 = 𝑤∗(1 + 𝜖)−(1−𝛽)𝜃 ; ℎ(0) = 1 which is a property of ℎ(𝑒). The 





























𝛼  ℎ(𝜖)𝑤∗[𝑒(ℎ(𝜖)𝑤∗)]−1𝑔′(𝜖)  } 
For 𝜖 = 0  it follows that 
𝑑(Π𝑚−Π𝑛)
𝑑𝜖
|𝜖=0 = 0.That was for the profit maximization. Now for 
the employment the elasticity of the employment with respect to changes of the money supply 
is non-zero. But for 𝜖 = 0 this elasticity is given as: 
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(1 − (1 − 𝛽) ) + 𝛽(1 − 𝛽)   






 ;𝑤𝑛 = 𝑤∗(1 + 𝜖)−(1−𝛽)𝜃 and 𝑁0 =
𝑘1−𝛼
𝑒(𝑤∗)
 ,and divide 
𝑁
𝑁0






























For = 1  and 𝛽 = 0  the model goes to money neutrality. Any deviation form profit 
maximizing price is second order to the firms. But firms adjust prices slowly following a 




by a first-order amount, which cause first order changes on output and employment. Which 
means that monetary policy is effective1.Next it is shown profit maximizing pricing behavior 
of the firms. So, for the firm that has any market power their profits will be flat in the 
neighborhood of their optimum own price. Any deviation from the profit maximization prices 
causes small loss in profit, Akerlof (2001). 






1. Equilibrium Unemployment 
 
In this part we are explaining several reasons of unemployment: first are search and matching 
models with stochastic job matching. This literature draws primarily on: Alchian (1969), Phelps 
(1968), and Mortensen (1970); and Phelps et al. 1970. The driving impetus to this research 
came from Phelps’s (1967) and Friedman’s (1968) reappraisal of the Phillips curve and the 
natural rate approach to which this led, see Pissarides (2000).The endogenous job destruction 
model is based on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Labor force participation in the context of 
                                                          
1 Let’s suppose that money supply changes by the fraction 𝜖 , the losses for the non-profit maximizing firms are 
square of 𝜖, so if 𝜖 = 0.5 losses are 𝜖2 = 0.0025.So monetary policy is effective when pricing of the firms is near 
rational.  
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a job-matching model was considered by McKenna (1987). The fact that when there is search 
on the job the optimal policy can be described by two reservation wages was first noted in a 
partial context by Burdett (1978). Vacancy chains caused by quitting are studied by Contini and 
Revelli (1997) and Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen (1998). Stochastic job matchings were first 
analyzed by Jovanovic (1979) in a partial model of labor turnover.On the model of the effects 
of the policy : An early exception is the paper by Diamond (1981),which considered 
unemployment compensation as a policy to correct the inefficiencies introduced by the 
externalities in the model. Matching function model is given as 𝑚𝐿 = 𝑚(𝑢𝐿, 𝑣𝐿). This function 
is concave and homogenous of degree 1. Homogeneity or constant returns to scale.  Where 𝑢 is 
unemployment rate, 𝑣 -vacancy rate, 𝑢𝐿 unemployed worker L-total labor force, and vL job 
vacancies. Vacancy to filled jobs equals v/u is denoted to   and equals to: = 𝑚(𝑢/𝑣, 1),  𝛿𝑡 
is a small time intervak during some vacant job is matched to an unemployed person,with a 
probability 𝑞( )𝛿𝑡. To a  related Poisson process 𝜆 =
𝑚(𝑢𝐿,𝑣𝐿)
𝑢𝐿
  where 𝜆 = 𝑞( ) and has 
elasticity  1 − ( ) ≥ 0 .The mean duration of unemployment is 1/ 𝑞( ).Worker goes from 
employment to unemployment with probability 𝜆𝛿𝑡, the mean number of workers who enter 
unemployment during a small time interval is 𝜆(1 − 𝑢)𝐿𝛿𝑡, and the mean number who leave 
unemployment is 𝑚𝐿𝛿𝑡,pr we can rewrite the latter as: is 𝑢 𝑞( )𝐿𝛿𝑡,where 𝑞( )𝛿𝑡 is the 
transitional probability of unemployed. The evolution of mean unemployment is given as:?̇? =
𝜆(1 − 𝑢) − 𝑞( )𝑢. In the steady-state the mean rate of unemployment is given as: 𝜆(1 − 𝑢) =
𝑞( )𝑢. The equation that determines unemployment in terms of two transition states is:𝑢 =
𝜆
𝜆+𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
. Job creation rate is defined as the ratio of the number of jobs created to employment 
𝑚(𝑣,𝑢)
1 — 𝑢
 ,and job destruction rate is similarly defined as the ratio of the total number of jobs 
destroyed to employment 
𝜆(1−𝑢)
1−𝑢
 Let 𝐽 be the present-discounted value of expected profit from 
an occupied job and 𝑉 the present-discounted value of expected profit from a vacant job. With 
a perfect capital market, an infinite horizon and when no dynamic changes in parameters are 
expected, V satisfies the Bellman equation :𝑟𝑉 = — 𝑝𝑐 +  𝑞( )(𝐽 —  𝑉).A job is an asset 
owned by the firm. In a perfect capital market the valuation of the asset is such that the capital 
cost, 𝑟𝑉, is exactly equal to the rate of return on the asset: The vacant job costs 𝑝𝑐 per unit time 
and changes state according to a Poisson process with rate 𝑞( ). The equilibrium condition for 
the supply of vacant jobs is 𝑉 =  0, implying that:𝐽 =
𝑝𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
.Let 𝑈 and 𝑊 denote the present-
discounted value of the expected income stream of, respectively, an unemployed and an 
employed worker, including the imputed return from nonmarket activities. The unemployed 
worker enjoys (expected) real return 𝑧 while unemployed, and in unit time he expects to move 
into employment with probability 𝑞( ).Hence 𝑈 satisfies 𝑟𝑈 = 𝑧 + 𝑞( )(𝑊 − 𝑈), 𝑟𝑈 can 
be given two useful interpretations. First it is the average expected return on the worker’s human 
capital during search, it is the minimum compensation that an unemployed worker requires to 
give up search (reservation wage). Employed workers earn a wage 𝑤; they lose their jobs and 
become unemployed at the exogenous rate it. Hence the valuation placed on them by the market, 
𝑊, satisfies 𝑟𝑊 = 𝑤 + 𝜆(𝑈— 𝑊). Without on-the-job search, workers stay in their jobs for as 
long as W≥ U. the permanent incomes of unemployed and employed workers, in terms of the 









The job is worth to the worker : 𝑟𝑊𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝜆(𝑊𝑖 − 𝑈) the job rate for this job satsfies : 𝑤𝑖 =
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑊𝑖 − 𝑈)
𝛽(𝐽𝑖 − 𝑉)
1−𝛽 ,where 𝛽 is labor’s share of the total surplus that an occupied 
Third International Scientific Conference 




job creates, 𝛽 =
1
2
 is the most plausible value. 𝛽 =
1
2
 is the most plausible value.Wage function 
now is: 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑟𝑈 + 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑟),where 𝑟𝑈 -reservation wage, 𝛽(𝑝 − 𝑟) fraction of net surplus they 




the aggregate wage equation that holds in equilibrium,𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑧 + 𝛽𝑝(1 + 𝑐 ).It is 
intuitive for a market equilibrium if we note that 𝑝𝑐  is the average hiring cost for each 
unemployed worker (since 𝑝𝑐  =  𝑝𝑐𝑣/𝑢 and 𝑝𝑐𝑣 is total hiring cost in the economy). if we 




𝑝.With capital 𝑤 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑧 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑓(𝑘) − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘 + 𝑐 ) is the 
aggregate wage equation that holds in equilibrium. With the out of steady state dynamics the 
value of vacant and filled job are becoming: 
Equation 11 
𝑟𝑉 = −𝑝𝑐 + ?̇? + 𝑞( )(𝐽 − 𝑉)  ;  𝑟𝐽 = 𝑝 − 𝑤 + 𝐽̇ − 𝜆𝐽 
In the asset value of a vacant job, expected capital gains from changes in the valuation of the 
asset ?̇?, yield −𝑝𝑐 and expected capital gains from the chance of finding a worker to take the 
vacancy 𝑞( )(𝐽 − 𝑉).In the value of the filled job equation 𝐽-̇ is the expected capital gain from 
changes in job value during adjustment.Our assumption that firms exploit all profit 
opportunities from new jobs, regardless of whether they are in the steady state or out of it, 
implies that 𝑉 =  ?̇? = 0. 𝐽 =
𝑝𝑐
𝑞( )
 ;  𝐽̇ = (𝑟 + 𝜆)𝐽 − (𝑝 − 𝑤). The arbitrage equations when 
changes in valuations take place because of out-of-steady-state dynamics are 
Equation 12 
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑧 + ?̇? + 𝑞( )(𝑊 − 𝑈) ; 𝑟𝑊 = 𝑤 + ?̇? + 𝜆(𝑈 − 𝑊) 
In the endogenous job destruction model, The asset value of a job with productivity in the 
range 1 ≥  𝑥 ≥  𝑅 satisfies :𝑟𝐽(𝑥) = 𝑝𝑥 − 𝑤(𝑥) + 𝜆 ∫ 𝐽(𝑠)𝑑𝐺(𝑠) − 𝜆𝐽(𝑥)
1
𝑅
. For the worker the 
returns from working at a job with idiosyncratic productivity 𝑥 satisfy 
Equation 13 
𝑟𝑊(𝑥) = 𝑤(𝑥) + 𝜆 ∫ 𝑊(𝑠)𝑑𝐺(𝑠) + 𝜆𝐺(𝑅)𝑈 − 𝜆𝑊(𝑥)
1
𝑅
   
The reservation productivity 𝑅, is defined by:𝐽(𝑅) = 0 .By the reservation property, firms 
destroy all jobs with idiosyncratic productivity 𝑥 <  𝑅 and continue producing in all jobs with 
productivity 𝑥 ≥  𝑅. Therefore the flow into unemployment (job destruction) is given by 
𝜆(𝑅)(1 —  𝑢). As before, the flow out of unemployment is equal to job creation, 𝑚(𝑣, 𝑢)  =
𝑞( )𝑢.The evolution of unemployment is therefore given by ?̇?  = 𝜆𝐺(𝑅)(1 —  𝑢) — 𝑞( )𝑢. 




𝜆𝐺(𝑅) + 𝑞( )
 
For the analysis of additive shifts, we suppose that all idiosyncratic productivities 𝑥 depend on an 
additive shift parameter ℎ, such that :𝑥(ℎ) = 𝑥 + ℎ Thus, in examining the effects of a change in the 







; (1 + ℎ)𝑅 − ℎ  ?̅? +
(1+ℎ)𝜆
𝑟+𝜆










Wage equation here is given as: 𝑤(𝑥)  =  (1 — 𝛽)𝑧 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑥 +  𝑐 ) where,  
Equation 15 




 (𝑟 + 𝜆)𝐽(𝑥)  =  (1 — 𝛽)𝑝(𝑥 —  𝑅). 
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(𝑟 + 𝜆)𝐽(𝑥) =  (1 − 𝛽)(𝑝𝑥 −  𝑧) − 𝛽𝑝𝑐  +
𝜆(1 − 𝛽)𝑝
𝑟 + 𝜆




the expected gain from a new job to the firm must be equal to the expected hiring cost that the 






, if we let 𝑧 = 𝜌𝑤, where p is the replacement 
rate (a policy parameter), then the wage equation becomes: 𝑤 =
𝛽(1+𝑐𝜃)
1−(1−𝛽)𝜌
𝑝. Now in the out of 
steady-state dynamics, as before, 𝑈 denotes the net worth of an unemployed worker and 𝑊 the 
net worth of an employed worker. The arbitrage equations when changes in valuations take 
place because of out-of-steady-state dynamics are1:𝑟𝑈 = 𝑧 + ?̇? + 𝑞( )(𝑊 − 𝑈) ; 𝑟𝑊 = 𝑤 +
?̇? + 𝜆(𝑈 − 𝑊). Thus, in examining the effects of a change in the variability of the productivity 
distribution, we write 
Equation 17 







(1 + ℎ)𝑅 − ℎ  ?̅? +
(1 + ℎ)𝜆
𝑟 + 𝜆










Differentiation with respect to ℎ, however, shows that at ℎ =  0 both market tightness and the 







= ?̅? − 𝑅 −
𝜆
𝑟 + 𝜆






/𝜕ℎ )      













Elasticity notation  








[1 − 𝐺(𝑅)]] (1 − 𝑅) − ?̅? + 𝑅 +
𝜆
𝑟 + 𝜆




1 − ?̅? −
𝜆
𝑟+𝜆
∫ (1 − 𝑠)𝑑𝐺(𝑠)
1
𝑅




?̅?  − 𝑅 −
𝜆
𝑟 + 𝜆





(1 − 𝛽) ( )
 𝑐  
Similarly, for given market tightness, the higher interest rate reduces the option value of the 
job, and so the reservation productivity is higher. The effect of these shifts on market tightness 
is unambiguously negative, but it is ambiguous on the reservation productivity. To see this, 














], the reservation productivity 




𝑝[𝐸(𝑥|𝑥 ≥ 𝑅) + 𝑐 ]; Unemployment income is proportional to the general productivity parameter , 
𝑝 . Substitution of z gives the new job destruction condition:𝑅 −
𝜌𝛽
1−𝜌(1−𝛽)
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. In the endogenous job creation with capital, reservation productivity 𝑅, defined 
by 𝐽(𝑅) = 0.By the reservation property, firms destroy all jobs with idiosyncratic productivity 
𝑥 <  𝑅 and continue producing in all jobs with productivity 𝑥 ≥  𝑅. Therefore the flow into 
unemployment (job destruction) is given by 𝜆(𝑅)(1 —  𝑢). As before, the flow out of 
unemployment is equal to job creation, 𝑚(𝑣, 𝑢)  = 𝑞( )𝑢. The evolution of unemployment is 
therefore given by:?̇?  = 𝜆𝐺(𝑅)(1 —  𝑢) — 𝑞( )𝑢 1. Job creation and job destruction 
conditions, wage sharing rule gives the following equation 
Equation 20 
𝑤(𝑥) = (1 − 𝛽)𝑧 + 𝛽𝑝𝑥[𝑓(𝑘) − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘] + 𝛽𝑝𝑐  
(𝑟 + 𝜆)𝐽(𝑥) = (1 − 𝛽)𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑅)[𝑓(𝑘) − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘] 









] − (1 − 𝛽)𝑧 − 𝛽𝑝𝑐  




(𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘] =
𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
 . The job destruction condition is derived from  
Equation 21 
[𝑓(𝑘) − (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑘] [𝑅 +
𝜆
𝑟 + 𝜆










Aggregate capital in this economy is :𝐾 = 𝐿(1 − 𝑢)𝑝𝑘 ∫ 𝑥𝑑𝐺(𝑥)
1
𝑅
 and aggregate output 
𝐹(𝐿(1 —  𝑢), 𝐾), or in per unit terms : 𝑌 = 𝐿(1 − 𝑢)𝑝𝑓(𝑘) ∫ 𝑥𝑑𝐺(𝑥)
1
𝑅
 . And now, with  labour 
force participation the model becomes : When workers are out of the labor force, they enjoy 
leisure worth 𝑙0, in real terms, which they lose when they enter the market. Formally, we assume 









Consider a household which has nonhuman wealth 𝐴 and no members in the labor force. We 
assume that the utility that a typical member of the household derives from nonparticipation is 
proportional to the permanent flow of income derived from household wealth:𝑙0 = 𝑙𝑟𝐴  
cdf 𝐻(𝑙) : 𝑙𝑜 = 𝑙𝑟(𝐴 + 𝑊) . A non-human wealth W is human wealth (present discounted value 
of income from employment) Finally, if a household has one unemployed participant and no 
employed members,its wealth is 𝐴 +  𝑈, with 𝑈 given by (1.12) or (7.1), so the utility of a 
nonparticipating member is :𝑙𝑜 = 𝑙𝑟(𝐴 + 𝑈). One in a household with an unemployed 
participant will have,𝑙𝑟 =
𝑈
𝐴+𝑈 






< 1. Hence the two equations giving the worker’s 
present-discounted utility during unemployment and during employment in some job 𝑗 are, 





ℎ𝑗 = 1 
                                                          
1 The value of a job with idiosyncratic productivity parameter 𝑥 now satisfies ; 𝑟[𝐽(𝑥) + 𝑝𝑥𝑘] =
𝑝𝑥[𝑓(𝑘) − 𝛿𝑘] − 𝑤(𝑥) + 𝜆 ∫ 𝐽(𝑠)𝑑𝐺(𝑠) − 𝜆𝐽(𝑥)
1
𝑅
 ;𝑓′(𝑘) = 𝑟 + 𝛿 
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Let 𝑝 be the product per hour input. Then, the present-discounted value of profit from a vacant 
job and from a filled job 𝑗 are, respectively1, 
Equation 24 





Wage equation here is :𝑤 = 𝛽𝑝 (1 +
𝑐
ℎ
).And now about Labor Turnover and On-the-Job 
Search, We begin by introducing three new labor flows into the job creation and job destruction 
model: , which are modeled as jump processes with constant exogenous rate: entry into the 
labor force taking place at rate 𝑏 (for births), exit from the labor force at rate 𝑑 (for deaths), and 
quitting into unemployment to look for another job at rate 𝜆0. As before, we assume that there 
is a jump process that shocks idiosyncratic productivity at rate 𝜆. This leads to job destruction 
and a flow into unemployment of 𝜆𝐺(𝑅)(1 —  𝑢)𝐿 workers, with 𝐿 denoting the total labor 
force. In addition there is now a flow of new entrants 𝑏𝐿 into unemployment and quits 
𝜆0(1 —  𝑢)𝐿. The exits from unemployment are the retirements, 𝑑𝑢𝐿, and the total matches of 
unemployed workers with vacant jobs which we write, as previously, as 𝑞( ) 𝑢𝐿 Total 
unemployment is given by 𝑢𝐿, so its evolution is given by: 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑢𝐿 = [𝜆𝐺(𝑅) + 𝜆0](1 − 𝑢)𝐿 +
𝑏𝐿 + 𝑑𝑢𝐿 − 𝑞( ) 𝑢𝐿2.The rate of growth of labor force 
 ?̇?  
𝐿
 id given by the total entry less total 
exit,𝑏 − 𝑑 ,and now the equation of the evolution of unemployment is given as:?̇? =
[𝜆𝐺(𝑅) + 𝜆0 + 𝑏](1 − 𝑢) − 𝑞( ) 𝑢. The steady state level of unemployment derived from 
previous is  
Equation 25 
 ?̇? =
𝜆𝐺(𝑅) + 𝜆0 + 𝑏
𝜆𝐺(𝑅) + 𝜆0 + 𝑏 + 𝑞( ) 𝑢
 
The value of a vacant job is given, as before, by : 𝑟𝑉 = −𝑝𝑐 + 𝑞( )[𝐽(𝑉) − 𝑉].About the 
search on the job, If unemployment is again 𝑢, vacancies 𝑣 and the number of employed job 
seekers is denoted by 𝑒 ≤  1 —  𝑢, we write the aggregate matching function as : 𝑚 =
𝑚(𝑣, 𝑢 + 𝑒).Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the rate at which workers arrive 
to vacancies is a function of the ratio of vacancies to all job seekers. We use the same notation 
as before, 𝑞( ) ≡ 𝑚 (1,
𝑢+𝑒
𝑣
) but with now denoting the ratio 
𝑣
𝑢 + 𝑒
. The approach that we 
follow in order to find the optimal search strategy is to calculate the worker’s returns for each 
productivity x when he is and when he is not searching on the job. Let the former be 𝑊’(𝑥) and 
the latter 𝑊”‘(𝑥). Then search on the job takes place at productivity x when 𝑊𝑠(𝑥) ≥ 𝑊𝑛𝑠(𝑥). 
Trivially, at maximum productivity, search on the job is not optimal, 𝑊𝑠(1) ≤ 𝑊𝑛𝑠.The 
reservation productivity, if it exists, satisfies :𝑊𝑠(𝑆) ≥ 𝑊𝑛𝑠(𝑆). To avoid trivial outcomes for 
search on the job, we assume that the cost 𝜎 is sufficiently 
small to imply that if there is a reservation rule defined by 𝑆, then 𝑆 >  𝑅. 
But first we need to demonstrate that the reservation rule exists, namely 
that 𝑊𝑠(𝑥) — 𝑊𝑛𝑠(𝑥) decreases in 𝑥.The expected returns of the employed worker when he 
does and when he does not search respectively satisfy 
                                                          
1 The wage rate that maximizes previous satisfies the condition :𝛽(𝐽𝑗 − 𝑉)𝜙(1 − ℎ𝑗) − (1 − 𝛽)(𝑊𝑗 − 𝑈) = 0.Hours of work 
also maximize, and the condition they satisfy is 𝛽(𝐽𝑗 − 𝑉)𝑤𝑗𝜙(1 − ℎ𝑗) (1 −
𝜙′(.)
𝜙(.)
ℎ𝑗) + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑊𝑗 − 𝑈)(𝑝 − 𝑤𝑗) = 0 ;  𝐽 =
𝑝𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
 ; ℎ(𝑝 − 𝑤) −
𝑟+𝜆
𝑞(𝜃)




2 The evolution of the unemployment rate is : ?̇? = [𝜆𝐺(𝑅) + 𝜆0](1 − 𝑢) + 𝑏 + 𝑑𝑢 − 𝑞( ) 𝑢 −
𝑢  ?̇?  
𝐿
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𝑟𝑊𝑠(𝑥) = 𝑤𝑠(𝑥) − 𝜎
+ 𝜆 ∫ max(𝑊𝑛𝑠(𝑠), 𝑊𝑠(𝑠)) 𝑑𝐺(𝑠) + 𝜆𝐺(𝑅)𝑈 − 𝜆𝑊𝑠(𝑥)
1
𝑅
+ 𝑞( )[𝑊𝑛𝑠(1) − 𝑊𝑠  (𝑥)] 




Now in the equilibrium The evolution of the number of job seekers 𝑒 is given as:  ?̇? =
𝜆(1 − 𝑢)[𝐺(𝑠) − 𝐺(𝑅)] − 𝜆𝑒 − 𝑞( )𝑒 . In the steady state :𝑒 =
𝜆[𝐺(𝑆)−𝐺(𝑅)]
𝜆+𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
(1 − 𝑢) ; ?̇? =
𝜆𝐺(𝑅)(1 − 𝑢) − 𝑞( ) 𝑢.Vacancies are given by : 𝑣 = (𝑢 + 𝑒). To derive the final equation, 
for the reservation 𝑅 we impose the job destruction condition 𝐽𝑠(𝑅) = 0.To simplify the 
notation, we denote the option value of the job by Λ and write 
Equation 27 
Λ = 𝜆 ∫ max (𝐽𝑛𝑠(𝑠), 𝐽𝑠(𝑠)𝑑𝐺(𝑠)
1
𝑅
= 𝜆 ∫  𝐽𝑠(𝑠)𝑑𝐺(𝑠)
1
𝑅













𝑝𝑐 − 𝜎) 
Λ = 𝜆(1 − 𝛽)𝑝 (
1
𝑟 + 𝜆 + 𝑞( )
∫ (𝑠 − 𝑅)𝑑𝐺(𝑠) +
1
𝑟 + 𝜆
















)(1 − 𝐺(𝑠)  


















.Now about stochastic job matchings, the idea formalized in 
this chapter is that jobs and workers have many unobservable characteristics that can influence 
the productivity of a job match. Two vacant jobs may look the same to a worker before he 
searches the firms offering them; two workers may look the same to a firm before it screens 
them. But when the jobs and workers are brought together, one pair may be more productive 
than the other. The new feature now introduced is the ex post match specific heterogeneity. We 
refer to this extension of the model as stochastic job matchings. Because all firms and workers 
are ex ante identical, the reservation productivity 𝛼𝑟 is common to all job-worker pairs. So if 
all productivities 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼𝑟 are accepted, the fraction of acceptable job contacts is 
:∫ 𝑑𝐺(𝛼) = 1 − 𝐺(𝛼𝑟)
1
𝛼𝑟




𝐺(𝛼𝑟)]𝑚.Where [1 − 𝐺(𝛼𝑟)]𝑚 is the rate of job matching . and workers move from 
unemployment to employment at the rate :𝑞𝑤 = [1 − 𝐺(𝛼𝑟)]
𝑚(𝑢,𝑣)
𝑣
= [1 − 𝐺(𝛼𝑟)] 𝑞( ) 
.Unemployment rate is given as:𝑢 =
𝜆
𝜆+𝜃𝑞(𝜃)[1−𝐺(𝛼𝑟)]
 .In general, the wage rate offered will 
depend on the productivity of the job match: 𝑤𝑗 = 𝑤(𝑎𝑗): 𝑤𝑟 = 𝑤(𝑎𝑟) and 𝑞𝑖
𝑤 =
𝑞( )[1 − 𝐺(𝛼𝑟𝑖)] .The net worth of unemployed worker 𝑖 and employed worker 𝑗satisfies: 
𝑟𝑈𝑖 = 𝑧 + 𝑞𝑖
𝑤(𝑊𝑖






𝑤  ; 𝑤𝑟 =
(𝑟+𝜆)𝑧+𝑞𝑤𝑤𝑒
𝑟+𝜆+𝑞𝑤
.In equilibrium following system of equations 
that holds: 
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𝑤𝑒 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑧 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑎










𝑝𝑐    ;  (1 − 𝛽) (𝑎𝑒 −
𝑧
𝑝




If we differentiate productivity versus 
𝑧
𝑝






.Now about the 
effects of policy : We introduce the possibility of progressive or regressive taxation by 
assuming that if the gross wage at a job 𝑗 is 𝑤𝑗 the net wage received by the worker is 
(1 —  𝑡)(𝑤𝑗  + 𝜏). It is convenient to think of workers as receiving a tax subsidy 𝜏, and 
subsequently taxed on their total labor earnings, including the subsidy, at the proportional rate 
𝑡. With this tax the net transfer from the worker to the tax authorities is: 𝑇(𝑤𝑗) = 𝑡𝑤𝑗 −
(1 − 𝑡)𝜏. Marginal tax rate 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 1. We will follow a simple approach to the modeling of 
hiring and firing taxes by assuming that the firm that hires a worker whose initial (general) 
productivity is 𝑝 receives a hiring subsidy of 𝑝𝐻, and when the separation takes place, it has to 
pay a tax 𝑝𝑇. exogenous. In those cases we define net unemployment benefit by 𝑏 =
𝜌[𝑝 − 𝑇(𝑝)].About the wage determination with policy following is true:𝑝 − 𝑤 −
(𝑟+𝜆𝑝𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
= 0   
𝑤(1 − 𝛽)𝑧 + 𝛽(1 + 𝑐 )𝑝 .The unemployed worker’s net worth with policy is given by: 
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑧 + 𝑏 + 𝑞( )(𝑊 − 𝑈) ; 𝑟𝑊𝑗 = 𝑤𝑗 − 𝑇(𝑤𝑗) + 𝜆(𝑈 − 𝑊𝑗).The firms net worth from a 
vacancy and from job paying 𝑤𝑗 are given by:𝑟𝑉 = −𝑝𝑐 + 𝑞( )(𝐽 + 𝑝𝐻 − 𝑉) ;𝑟𝐽𝑗 = 𝑝 + 𝑎 −
𝑤𝑗 − 𝜆(𝐽𝑗 + 𝑝𝐹). Where hiring subsidy is 𝑝𝐻, employment is subsidized at the rate 𝑎 per job, 
firing tax 𝑝𝐹,  tax subsidy 𝜏 ,the replacemet rate 𝜌 ,marginal tax rate 𝑡 . Therefore the initial 
wage is chosen to maximize the product:𝐵0 = (𝑊𝑗 − 𝑈)
𝛽
(𝐽 − 𝑗 + 𝑝𝐻 − 𝑉)1−𝛽. But after the 
worker is taken on, the benefit to the firm from continuation of the contract is only 𝐽𝑗 since no 
further hiring subsidies are received. In contrast, now the firing tax becomes operational, and if 




(𝐽𝑗 + 𝑝𝐹 − 𝑉)
1−𝛽
 
Following the terminology introduced in the literature by Lindbeck and Snower (1988), we 
refer to 𝑤0𝑗, as the “outside” wage and to 𝑤𝑗 as the “inside” wage: 𝑤0𝑗, is negotiated by those 
still outside the firm, before the firm gets locked in by turnover taxes, and 𝑤𝑗, is negotiated by 
those inside the firm, who benefit from the firing restrictions imposed on the firm. Given our 
assumptions, the outside (initial) wage solves :𝛽
𝜕𝑊𝑗
𝜕𝑤0𝑗




𝑈) = 0. and the inside (continuation) wage solves :𝛽
𝜕𝑊𝑗
𝜕𝑤0𝑗
























the outside and inside wage equations derived in equilibrium respectively are—that is, imposing 








− (1 − 𝜌)𝜏] +
𝛽
1 − 𝜌(1 − 𝛽)
[(1 + 𝑐 − 𝜆𝐹 + (𝑟 + 𝜆)𝐻)𝑝 + 𝑎] 
𝑤 =
1 − 𝛽




− (1 − 𝜌)𝜏] +
𝛽
1 − 𝜌(1 − 𝛽)
[(1 + 𝑐 − 𝑟𝐹)𝑝 + 𝑎] 
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the job destruction rule is: 
Equation 32 
𝑅 +
𝑎 + (1 − 𝜌)𝜏
𝑝

















𝑚(𝑠, 𝑢, 𝑣), 𝑠𝑖 efficiency units supplied by the worker , Here 𝑠 is the equilibrium search 
intensity supplied by the representative worker.The worker’s cost of 𝑠𝑖 units of search is 𝜎𝑖 =





𝑝𝑐  ; 𝜎(𝑠𝑖, 𝑧) = 𝑧ℎ(𝑠) 
Where ℎ(𝑠) are the number of hours devoted to search., ℎ′(𝑠) > 0; ℎ′′(𝑠) ≥ 0; 𝑠𝑧ℎ′(𝑠) =
𝛽(1−𝑡)
1−𝛽




















. In the policy of compensating changes, 𝐹 = 𝐻 (fired = hired workers): 
Equation 34 
𝑎 + (1 − 𝜌)𝜏 − 𝑝𝜌 + 𝑟𝑝𝐹 −
𝑧
1−𝑡
= −𝑧   ; 𝑎 + 𝜏 = −𝑟𝑝𝐹 +
𝑡
1−𝑡
𝑧 + 𝜌(𝑝 + 𝜏)  
Tax subsidy 𝜏 should be chosen to satisfy following:  𝜏 =
𝜌
1−𝜌
𝑝    ;  𝜏 =
𝑡
1−𝑡
𝑧 + 𝜌(𝑝 + 𝜏) ; 𝜏 =
𝑡𝑧+𝑏
1−𝑡
, the net revenue raised by the government is, from 𝑇 = [𝑡𝑤𝑒 − (1 − 𝑡)𝜏](1 − 𝑢) −
𝑢𝑏, where 𝑤𝑒 conditional expectation pre-tax wage :𝑇 = 𝑡(𝑤𝑒 − 𝑧)(1 − 𝑢) − 𝑏 pre-tax wage 
rate for given 𝑥 is also : 
Equation 35 
𝑤(𝑥) = (1 − 𝛽) (
𝑧+𝑏
1−𝑡
− 𝜏) + 𝛽(𝑥 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝐹) + 𝛽𝑎 ;  𝑤(𝑥) = (1 − 𝛽)𝑧 + 𝛽(𝑥 + 𝑐 ) 
This model also includes search externalities: 
Equation 36 
𝑎 − (1 − 𝜌)𝜏
𝑝











𝑐 − 𝐹 + 𝐻 −
𝑐
(1 − 𝛽)𝑞( )
= −
𝑐
(1 − )𝑞( )
 



















) 𝑐𝑝  it follows that the reservation productivity R with policy intervention 
is higher than in the policy-free environment if: 𝑎 + (1 − 𝜌)𝜏 − 𝑝𝜌 + 𝑟𝑝𝐹 −
𝑧
1−𝑡




− 𝑟𝑝𝐹 , the effect on job creation is neutralized if hiring subsidies and firing taxes are 
chosen such that: −
𝑑𝑅
𝑟+𝜆
− 𝐹 + 𝐻 = 0 .One basic model of search intensity(without policy 
effects) that follows Card-Chetty-Weber (2007). Worker receives wage 𝑤 if employed and with 




worker who is unemployed chooses search intensity 𝑠 which is the probability of finding a job. 
Unemployment benefit that unemployed worker receives is 𝑏, and it is included in the value 
function for unemployment, also wage 𝑤 is included for when the worker finds a job: 
Equation 37 
 𝑉(𝑏, 𝑤) = max
𝑠
{𝑏 + 𝛽[𝑠𝑈(𝑤) + (1 − 𝑠)𝑉(𝑏, 𝑤) − 𝜓𝑠} 
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Where 𝜓(𝑠) are the convex search costs of the job. The optimal level of search by First order 
condition solves: 
Equation 38 
𝜓(𝑠∗) = 𝛽[𝑈(𝑤) − 𝑉(𝑏, 𝑤)]; 𝑉(𝑏, 𝑤) =
𝑏 + 𝛽𝑠∗𝑈(𝑤) − 𝜓(𝑠∗)
1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽𝑠 
 


















= −𝛽𝑉𝑏 ;  𝜓
′′(𝑠∗) > 0 and 𝜓′′(𝑠∗) =
𝜕𝑠∗
𝜕𝑤
= −𝛽(𝑈𝑤 − 𝑉𝑤).And since 
𝜓′′(𝑠∗) > 0 𝑠∗ decreases with 𝑏 and increases with 𝑤 .  
2. One peculiar source of unemployment: social customs and a notion fair wage 
 
Here we are recalling Akerlof’s (1980), Theory of social custom, of which unemployment may 
be a consequence, and a gift exchange model Akerlof’s (1982), Labor Contracts as Partial Gift 
Exchange. Here 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑟 =
?̅?
?̅?+1 
 ,where ?̅? is a fair wage. Utility function of a 
worker is  :𝑈 = 𝑎𝐿 + 𝑏𝐿𝐾 + 𝑐𝐿𝜖𝑅 − 𝑑
𝑅𝑑𝐶  𝐶̅ where 𝑎𝐿 ∈ (−∞ , ∞) ; 𝑏𝐿 ∈ (0, ∞) ; 𝑐𝐿 ∈
(0, ∞).Utility function of a capitalist is 𝑈 = 𝑎𝐾 + 𝑏𝑘𝐾 + 𝑐𝑘𝑅 where 𝑎𝐾 ∈ (−∞ , ∞) ; 𝑏𝐾 ∈
(0, ∞) ; 𝑐𝐾 ∈ (0, ∞).In the previous expressions: 𝑑
𝑅- e dummy variable 0 if worker obeys the 
code 1 if he disobeys, 𝑑𝐶- is a dummy  variable  0 if worker believes in the code of behavior 
and 1 otherwise, 𝑅- is the worker reputation, 𝐶̅-is a parameter that explains the loss in the utility 
of disobeying the code. 𝑅 = 0 means that the agent obeys the code , 𝑅 = −𝜇 ?̅?-agent disobeys 
the code   *𝜇 is a part of the population that believes the code, ?̅?-Is a positive constant  and   
𝑅 = −𝑑𝑅𝜇 ?̅? while the evolution of the code of behavior is ?̇? = 𝛽(𝑥 − 𝜇).Where in the last 
expression 𝑥 is a part of population that conducts the code of behavior. Labor and capital are 
separated in three parts :𝐿1, 𝐾1 is trade at   ?̅? fair wage, 𝐿2, 𝐾2 is traded 𝜔 ≠ ?̅?,𝐿3, 𝐾3 -is not 
trading at all. There exists threshold wage  𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡. If 𝜔 < 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 capitalist will break the code and 
will pay 𝜔 ≠ ?̅?  in exchange for unit of capital. If  ?̅? > 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡, capitalist will trade unit of capital 
















In equilibrium (notional demand ND) : 
• 𝐿1
𝑁𝐷 = 0; 𝜔 < 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 
• ?̅?𝐿1
𝑁𝐷 + 𝜔𝐿2
𝑁𝐷 = 𝐾; 𝜔 = 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡; 𝐿1
𝑁𝐷 ≥ 0; 𝐿2
𝑁𝐷 ≥ 0 
• 𝐿1





 ;  𝜔 < 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 
• 𝐿2
𝑁𝐷 = 0; 𝜔 > 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 
Worker trades at rate   ?̅?  or  𝜔 dependent on :  𝑎𝐿 + 𝑏𝐿?̅? ≷ 𝑎𝐿 + 𝑏𝐿𝜔 − 𝑐𝐿𝜇𝜖 ?̅? − 𝑑
𝐶  𝐶̅. 
According to previous inequality worker with tastes  𝜖 > (𝑏𝐿(𝜔 − ?̅?) − 𝑑
𝐶  𝐶̅/𝑐𝐿𝜇?̅? has 
Notional supply of labor traded at  ?̅? per unit. Worker with 𝜖 < (𝑏𝐿(𝜔 − ?̅?) − 𝑑
𝐶  𝐶̅/𝑐𝐿𝜇?̅? has 
a equilibrium supply of labor traded at  𝜔 ≠ ?̅?  per unit .f we take into consideration the 
distribution of tastes 𝐹 we got : 𝐿1
𝑁𝑆 = 𝐿{𝜇(1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑙) + (1 − 𝜇)(1 − 𝐹(𝑧′𝑙)}. If  𝜔 < 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡  
𝐿1
𝑁𝐷 = 0 .If  𝜔 > 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡capitalist like to trade at  ?̅? ,hence 𝐿1
𝑁𝐷 = 𝐾/?̅? ,if  𝜔 < ?̅? all workers 
will trade labor for capital  ?̅? , hence 𝐿1
𝑁𝑆 = 𝐿. Hence  𝐿2
𝑁𝑆 = 𝐿{𝜇𝐹(𝑧𝑙) + (1 − 𝜇)(1 − 𝐹(𝑧′𝑙)} 
and 𝐿3
𝑁𝑆 = 0, where 𝑧𝑙 = (𝑏𝐿(𝜔 − ?̅?) − 𝐶̅)/𝑐𝐿𝜇?̅?  and 𝑧𝑙
′ = 𝑏𝐿(𝜔 − ?̅?) −  𝐶̅/𝑐𝐿𝜇?̅?. 𝐹(𝑧) is a 
Third International Scientific Conference 




proportion of population with taste for labor/capital 𝜖 ≤ 𝑧, whereas 𝜖-are personal tastes.  




 ;  𝜔 < 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 
and  ?̅?𝐿1
𝐸𝐷 + 𝜔𝐿2
𝐸𝐷 = 𝐾; 𝜔 = 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡; 𝐿1
𝐸𝐷 ≥ 0; 𝐿2
𝐸𝐷 ≥ 0; and 𝐿2
𝐸𝐷 = 0; 𝜔 > 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡. Effective 
labor supply is traded at  𝜔 ≠ ?̅? , 𝐿2
𝐸𝑆  is the sum of the two expressions. First if 𝜔 > ?̅? there 
are some workers that will trade 𝜔 . If  𝜔 < ?̅? there will be workers trying to find job at  ?̅?  but 
unsuccessfully. These workers decide whether will trade at а 𝜔 ≠ ?̅? and lose their reputation 
or not trade at all. Worker that is offering its labor at   ?̅? has a probability of being successful  
𝐿1
𝐸𝐷/𝐿2




𝑁𝑆. Utility of a worker that does not work is 
𝑎𝐿. All workers with tastes between (𝑏𝐿(𝜔 − ?̅?) − 𝑑
𝐶  𝐶̅/𝑐𝐿𝜇?̅? и (𝑏𝐿𝜔 − 𝑑
𝐶  𝐶̅/𝑐𝐿𝜇?̅? , will 




𝑁𝑆, of being unable to trade labor at rate ?̅? and they will trade at 𝜔 Asa 
result of which : 
Equation 40 
𝐿2




𝑁𝑆) {{𝜇𝐹(𝑧𝑢) − 𝐹(𝑧𝑙)} + (1 − 𝜇)[𝐹(𝑧𝑢

















 . Value at which  𝐿2
𝐸𝑆 = 𝐿2
𝐸𝐷   if 
𝜔 = 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 , that value is : 𝐿1
𝐸𝐷 = (𝐾 − 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝐿2
𝐸𝐷)/?̅? and hence  𝐿2
𝐸𝑆(𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡) = 𝐿{1 −
(𝐾 − 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝐿2
𝐸𝐷)/?̅?𝐿1
𝑁𝑆}{𝜇𝐹(𝑧𝑢) + (1 − 𝜇)𝐹(𝑧




= 0. If there is equilibrium it is ∈ (0,
𝐾
𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 
), which is a short run equilibrium for  𝜔  .  
Proposition: There is no equilibrium if  𝜔 > 𝜔∗  
Proof: Let  𝜔 > 𝜔∗ ,than  𝐿2
𝐸𝑆 ≠ 𝐿2
𝐸𝐷 for  𝜔 > 𝜔∗  
𝐿1
𝑁𝑆 + 𝐿2
















𝑁𝐷) 𝐾/𝐿𝜔  for  𝜔
















































































) because   ?̅? < 1 ; if  𝐿1




































 because  𝜔 > 𝜔∗ < ?̅? > 1 
With less strict inequality  𝐿1












   hence   𝐿2
𝐸𝐷 ≠ 𝐿2
𝐸𝑆  за 𝜔 > 𝜔∗ ∎ 
Proposition 1: On a long run 𝜇 = (𝐿1 + 𝐿3/)𝐿  representing the individuals that are obeying 
the code. In a short run 
𝐾
𝜔
= 𝐿  𝜔 =
𝐾
𝐿
= 1.According to a classical economics there is one 








= 𝜔 = 1. 
                                                          
1 Where 𝑧𝑢 = (𝑏𝐿𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶̅)/𝑐𝐿𝜇 ?̅? ; 𝑧′𝑢 = (𝑏𝐿𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶̅)/𝑐𝐿𝜇 ?̅? ; 𝐹(𝑧𝑙) = 𝐹(𝑧𝑙
′) = 0 
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Proof: If  𝜔 =
𝐾
𝐿
= 1 ; 𝜇 = 0 then 𝜔 < 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 = ?̅? ; 𝐿2








} {𝜇𝐹(𝑍𝑢) + (1 − 𝜇)𝐹(𝑧𝑢








= 1 which is 















= 𝜔 = 1 , 𝜇 =
0  is a  long run equilibrium ∎. 








= 𝜔 = 1 is the only short run equilibrium as   𝑅 ̅ → 0. 
If   𝐶̅ < 𝑏𝐿 , and 0 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 1 − 1/ min (
?̅?
𝑏𝐿








1 − 𝜇 as 𝑅 ̅ → 0. 
Proof: lim
?̅?→0
𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 0 there exists only one equilibrium for  𝜔 < 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 if  𝜔 <
?̅?,𝜔 < lim
?̅?→0




= 𝜇𝐹(𝑍𝑢) + (1 − 𝜇)𝐹(𝑧𝑢




= 1 if  𝜔 >
?̅?
𝑏𝐿
. If  𝜔 =
1, 𝜔 < 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 = lim
𝑅→0̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 and with assumption that  ?̅? > 1  ,so for  𝜔 = 1 , if   
?̅?
𝑏𝐿




















= 𝜔 = 1 is the only short run equilibrium for  𝜔 < 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡. 








> 1 therefore L2
ES ≠ L2
ED∎. 
Proposition 3: ωcrit ≠ ω  for  lim R̅ → 0 






= {1 − (K − ωcritL2
ES)/ω̅L}{μF(zu) +












 .Because ωcrit < ω̅ for   R̅ > 0 and since lim
R→0̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
ωcrit = ω̅ it follows lim








R→0̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
L2
ED ≠ L2
ES for  ω = ωcrit , this opposes the assumption that  L2
ED = L2
ES hence 
ω = ωcrit is not equilibrium value for ω∎.  




= (1 − (
K
L ω̅ 
) /ω̅L) {μF(zu) − F(zl) + (1 − μ)F(z
′(u) − F(z′(l)} + μF(zl) + (1 −
μ)F(zl
′)  where zl = (bL(ω − ω̅) − C̅)/cLμ R̅ and z′l = bL(ω − ω̅)/cLμ R̅ . If we evaluate  
lim ?̅? → 0 за 
?̅?
𝑏𝐿







> 0  for 𝜔 > 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 and  𝐿2
𝐸𝐷 = 0 за 𝜔 > 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 
.So that 𝐿2
𝐸𝐷 ≠ 𝐿2
𝐸𝑆  за 𝜔 > 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡∎ 









1 with  C̅ < bL 






 is a long run equilibrium if  𝜔 =
1
1−𝜇




= 1 − 𝑎𝑠  ?̅? → 0. 




= 1 − μ if  ω <  
C̅
bL
 ,as before ω =
1
1−μ





= (1 − 𝜇)
𝐾
𝐿


























= 1 − 𝜇 is a long run equilibrium 
because: ?̇? = 𝛽(1 − (1 − 𝜇) − 𝜇) = 0∎ . 
Proposition 5: for  ?̅? large enough, there exist stable equilibrium L2
𝐸𝑆 = 𝐿2
𝐸𝐷 = 0  and 𝜇 = 1 
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= (1 − (
𝐾
𝐿 ?̅? 
)) {𝜇𝐹(𝑧𝑢) − 𝐹(𝑧𝑙) +
(1 − 𝜇)𝐹(𝑧′(𝑢)}  
And let  ?̅? > 𝑏𝐿 ?̅? /𝑐𝐿𝜖0.Than  ?̅? > 𝜔 > ?̅?/(1 + (
𝑐𝐾
𝑏𝐾













= 0 ⇒ 1 − 𝜇 = 1 − 1 = 0.Since 
(𝐿1+𝐿3)
𝐿1
= 1. Near 1 𝜇 < 1 , 𝜇 = 1  motion is 
given as: ?̇? = 𝛽 (
𝐿1+𝐿3
𝐿−𝜇
) = 𝛽(1 − 𝜇) > 0  so 𝜇 = 1 is a stable equilibrium∎. 
In the fair wage model Akerlof (1982) explains that there exists fair wage as a function of : 
𝑤𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑓
= 𝑓(𝑤𝑖,𝑡, 𝑤0, 𝑏𝑢, 𝑢, 𝑒𝑖, 𝑒0) .Where: 𝑤𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑓
-is the perceived wage of 𝑖 at 𝑡 + 1;𝑤𝑖,𝑡-is the 
actual wage paid at 𝑡; 𝑤0-is the wage paid to others in i’s reference set;𝑏𝑢-is the unemployment 
benefits of the individuals reference set in the current and previous periods;𝑢- is the number of 
unemployed in the reference set in the current and previous periods;𝑒𝑖-is the individualís work 
rules in current and previous periods; 𝑒0- is the work rules of people in the individualís reference 
set in current and previous periods.Norms equation here is given as follows next :   𝑒𝑛 =
𝑒𝑛({𝑤(𝑒, 𝜖)}, 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑢𝑖 , … , 𝑢𝐽; 𝑤0, 𝑢, 𝑏𝑢), where {𝑤(𝑒, 𝜖)}-is the function that relates wages of a 
worker of type 𝜖 to his effort (thus, this is the firm’s remuneration system).Here 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛-work rule 
; 𝑢𝐽-is the utility of j
th worker ;𝑤0-is the wage paid by the other firms ;𝑢-unemployment rate 
and 𝑏𝑢-unemployment benefit. Worker takes a job if: max
(𝑒≥𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛)
𝑢(𝑒𝑛, 𝑒, 𝑤, 𝜖) > 𝑢(𝑏𝑢, 𝜖) . For the 
firms Output is: 𝑞 = 𝑓(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝐽). Where 𝐽 is the number of workers hired. The firm chooses 
wage function 𝑤(𝑒, 𝜖),work rules 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛  and number of workers to maximize:𝑝𝑓(𝑒1, , … , 𝑒𝐽) −
∑ 𝑤(𝑒, 𝜖)𝐽𝑗=1 .Where 𝑝 is the output price. It is assumed that workers of type 𝜖 are offered jobs 
at random. Model here explains equilibrium unemployment. Let  𝑙 ̅ be the workers per firm be 
the supply of labor. That is, this is the number of workers divided by the number of firms.Let 
output be:𝑞(𝑒, 𝑛) = 𝑒𝑛𝑎. There is no worker heterogeneity, and all workers will exert effort 
equal to the norm:𝑒 = 𝑒𝑛.Let the effort norm be a function of the firm’s  wage relative to the 





, 𝛾 < 1 .Let the reference wage be the geometric mean of 
the outside wage and the unemployment benefit so that: 𝑤𝑟 = 𝑤0
1−𝑢𝑏𝑢
𝑢.Where 𝑢 is the 
unemployment rate , 𝑤0 is the wage paid by other firms , and 𝑏𝑢 is the unemployment benefit. 






 , 𝛾 < 1 That is, it has the typical employment and wage levels. 
Let’s suppose that 𝑢 = 𝑢0 > 0, the paper asserts that the firm can obtain all the workers it wants 
at any wage. Firms now maximize:  max
𝑛,𝑤






 and reservation wage 𝑤𝑟 = 𝑤0
1−𝑢𝑏𝑢




= 0 = 𝛼𝑒𝛼𝑛𝛼−1 − 𝑤,frm there  𝛼𝑒𝛼𝑛𝛼−1 = 𝑤 and 𝑛𝛼−1 = 𝛼−1𝑤𝑒−𝛼 


















the Solow condition (Solow (1979)) is the observation that if effort depends on the wage, then 
at the optimal wage level, the elasticity of effort with respect to the wage must be one 
(otherwise, the wage is too high or too low).Solow condition states that: 
Equation 41 
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  where  
𝑏(1 − 𝛾)𝑤𝛾𝑤𝑟
−𝛾




















. We can see that 
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑢
< 0 thus 
the Solow condition is failing in the unemployment rate. But we notice that 𝑤 > 𝑤𝑟, under 









































. Which means 
that the Solow wage is greater than the reference wage if 𝑓 the elasticity of the effort with 
respect to the wage is initially greater than 1, meaning that the increase in wage beyond the 
reference wage pay for themselves. Now in the demand for labor equation we can plug the 










and after some manipulation 














. If this demand function is consistent with the 
unemployment rate, then the supply of labor must be: 
Equation 42 
𝑙 ̅ = 𝑙0 =
𝑛∗
1 − 𝑢















Since the reference wage us failing here with the unemployment rate, and henceforth is also 
rising in the unemployment rate, wages will fal and labor demand will rise with the increase 


















) > 0 𝑖𝑓 
𝛼
𝑏(1−𝛾)
> 1 ; 𝛼 < 1 . But notice that if 𝑏 = 0 ,then effort is 
increasing in wage, If 𝛼 < 0  .then 𝑒 = −𝛼 > 0,so effort is positive at any wage. In this case 




 ;   𝛼−1𝑤(−𝛼)1−𝛼 = 𝑛𝛼−1;  𝑛 = [𝛼−1𝑤(−𝛼 )1−𝛼]
1
𝛼−1 
And of course, the wage is equal to the marginal product of labor. So, we should expect that 
labor markets will clear (that is, all workers who want work at wage 𝑤 will receive it- though 
of course, if many additional workers wanted work, this would lower the wage, but that’s still 
market clearing). The first point is that if worker effort depends on a reference wage, then it 
may be logical for firms to pay a wage above that level to obtain extra effort. If so, the profit 
maximizing choice of labor input will not equate the marginal product with the reservation 
wage but rather with Solow wage (i.e the efficiency wage). At this point there will be 
equilibrium unemployment, that is workers will be willing to work at rate 𝑤  but firms will have 
no incentives to hire them. Because marginal product of labor at 𝑛∗ is equated with the 
efficiency wage (Solow wage). 
 
Third International Scientific Conference 




1. Fair pricing of Eyster, Madarsz, Michaillat, ( 2019) in Monopoly model and New 
Keynesian setting 
Prices are not fully flexible nor they are fixed ,see Carlsson and Skans (2012); De Loecker et 
al. (2016); Caselli, Chatterjee, Woodland (2017); Ganapati, Shapiro, and Walker 2019, Eyster, 
Madarsz, Michaillat,( 2019).This price rigidity is of first order importance since it determines 
the transmission of shocks and government policies to the economy. Rotemberg (2005) 
developed the first theory of price rigidity based on fairness considerations, also see Rotemberg 
(2011). Yet the theories of price rigidity do not include fairness yet  theories of price rigidity  
almost never includ fairnessconsiderations (Blanchard 1990;Mankiw and Reis 2010).  These 
models of fair pricing are explained in , Eyster, Madarsz, Michaillat,( 2019).In the monopoly 




is a given by a belief function. The perceived markup determines the fairness of the transaction 
through a fairness function 𝐹(𝑀𝑝) >  0. Both functions 𝒞𝑝(𝑃) and 𝐹(𝑀𝑝) are assumed to be 
twice differentiable.Customer consumption is given as: 𝑍 =  𝐹(𝑀𝑝(𝑃)) ·  𝑌 , where a 
quantity Y of the good is purchased at price P. Customer faces budget constraint: 𝑃 ·  𝑌 +  𝐵 =
 𝑊 ; where 𝑊 >  0 designates initial wealth, and 𝐵 designates remaining money balances. 






𝜖 + 𝐵. Where the parameter 𝜖 >  1 governs the concavity of the utility function. Given 
fairness factor 𝐹 and price 𝑃, the customer chooses purchases 𝑌 and money balances 𝐵 to 
maximize utility subject to the budget constraint. The monopoly has constant marginal cost C 
> 0. It chooses price 𝑃 and output 𝑌 to maximize prots (𝑃 −  𝐶)  ·  𝑌 subject to customers’ 
demand for its good.The demand curve is given as:𝑌𝑑(𝑃) = 𝑃−𝜖 ∙ 𝐹(𝑀𝑝(𝑃))
𝜖−1 
. The price 









. The first-order 
condition then yields the classical result that:𝑃 −
𝐸
𝐸−1
∙ 𝐶 ,that is, the monopoly optimally sets 
its price at a markup 𝑀 =
𝐸
𝐸 – 1
  over marginal cost. To learn more about the monopoly’s 




Lemma 1 When customers care about fairness, the elasticity of the fairness function 
Equation 44 




is strictly positive and strictly increasing on (0, 𝑀ℎ)with lim
𝑀𝑝→0
𝜙(𝑀𝑃) = 0  and 
lim
𝑀𝑝→𝑀ℎ






Proof. By definition,𝜙(𝑀𝑝)  =  −𝑀𝑝 · 𝐹′(𝑀𝑝)/𝐹(𝑀𝑝). Using the properties of the fairness function 
listed in definition, 𝐹(𝑀𝑝)  >  0 and 𝐹′(𝑀𝑝)  <  0, so 𝜙(𝑀𝑝)  >  0. The properties also indicate that 
𝐹 >  0 is decreasing in Mp, and that F0 < 0 is decreasing in Mp (as F is concave in Mp). Thus, both 
1/𝐹 >  0 and −𝐹′ >  0 are increasing in 𝑀𝑝, which implies that ϕ is strictly increasing in 𝑀𝑝. 
The properties also indicate that 𝐹(0) >  0 and 𝐹′(0) is finite, so lim
𝑀𝑝→0
𝜙(𝑀𝑃) = 0. Last, the 
properties indicate that 𝐹(𝑀ℎ)  =  0 while 𝑀ℎ  >  0 and 𝐹′(𝑀ℎ)  <  0, so that 
Трета Меѓународна Научна Конференција 






𝜙(𝑀𝑃) = +∞  . The final result immediately follows, as 𝜎 =  𝑀𝑝  ·  𝜙′(𝑀𝑝)/
𝜙(𝑀𝑝), 𝜙′(𝑀𝑝)  >  0, and 𝜙(𝑀𝑝) >  0∎. 
In the New Keynesian model with fairness, the perceived price markup evolves according to 
:𝑚?̂?(𝑡) = 𝛾[?̂?(𝑡) + 𝑚?̂?(𝑡 − 1). Accordingly, the perceived price markup is a discounted sum 
of lagged inflation terms:𝑚?̂?(𝑡) = ∑ 𝛾𝑠+1  ?̂?(𝑡 − 𝑠) ∞𝑠=0 . Because of its autoregressive 
structure, the perceived price markup is fully determined by past inflation.As a result, the 
short-run Phillips curve involves not only forward-looking elements—expected future inlation 
and employment—but also backward-looking elements—past inflation.In the New Keynesian 
model with fairness, the short-run Phillips curve is 
Equation 46 
(1 − 𝛿𝛾)𝑚?̂?(𝑡) − 𝜆1?̂?(𝑡) = 𝛿𝛾𝔼𝑡(?̂?(𝑡 + 1)) − 𝜆2𝔼𝑡(?̂?(𝑡 + 1)) 
Where  
Equation 47 
𝜆1 ≡ (1 + )






𝜆2 ≡ (1 + )𝛿






Hence short run equilibrium Philips curve is hybrid, including both past and future inflation 
rates:(1 − 𝛿𝛾) ∑ 𝛾𝑠+1  ?̂?(𝑡 − 𝑠) − 𝜆1?̂?(𝑡) =
∞
𝑠=0 𝛿𝛾𝔼𝑡(?̂?(𝑡 + 1)) − 𝜆2𝔼𝑡(?̂?(𝑡 + 1)).In the 
previous expression ?̂?(𝑡) is the employment. About the technology shocks it is assumed that 
the logarithm of technology 𝐴(𝑡) in the production function  𝑌𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑗(𝑡)𝑁𝑗(𝑡)
𝑎  follows an 
AR(1) process, such that: ?̂?(𝑡) = 𝜇𝑎 ∙ ?̂?(𝑡 − 1 ) + 𝑎(𝑡) where the disturbance 𝑎(𝑡) follows 
a white-noise process with mean zero, and µ𝑎 ∈ (0;  1). Pricing theory here implies that 
monetary policy is nonneutral in the short run, so that a transitory monetary shock affects 
employment. Here we develop another implication of the theory:monetary policy is nonneutral 
in the long run, so that different rates of steady-state inflation lead to different levels of steady-
state employment. In steady state the real interest rate equals the time discount rate 𝜌 ≡




. To obtain zero inflation, it suffices to set 𝑖0̅  =  𝜌; to obtain higher inflation, it suffices 
to reduce 𝑖0̅. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) have hypothesized that “any stable state 
of affairs tends to become accepted eventually”. We adapt this idea to our model by assuming 
that people become partially acclimated to the steady-state inflation rate. Formally, we 
generalize the fairness function to:  𝐹(𝑀𝑝) = 1 − ∙ (𝑀𝑝 − 𝑀𝑓), where 𝑀𝑓 is the fair markup 




, and the steady-state perceived markup 𝑀𝑝̅̅ ̅̅     : 𝑀𝑓 = 𝜒 ∙ 𝑀𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ + (1 − 𝜒) ∙ 
𝜖
𝜖−1 
. The parameter 𝜒 ∈ [0;  1] measures acclimation: when χ = 0, there is no acclimation, as in 
the previous version of the paper; when 𝜒 =  1, there is perfect acclimation, so people do not 
mind whatever is happening in steady state; when 𝜒 ∈ (0;  1), people may be permanently 
satisfied or dissatisfied in steady state, but less than when 𝜒 =  0. In the New Keynesian model 
with fairness, the steady-state perceived price markup is a strictly increasing function of steady-
state inflation: 
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Hence, the steady-state fairness factor is a weakly decreasing function of steady-state inflation: 
Equation 49 
F̅(π̅) = 1 − θ ∙ (1 − χ) ∙ [Mp̅̅ ̅̅ (π) −
ϵ
ϵ − 1 
] 
Accordingly, the steady-state elasticity of the fairness function is a strictly increasing function 
of steady-state inflation:  ϕ̅(π̅) =
θ∙Mp̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(π̅)
F̅(π̅)
. In the New Keynesian model with fairness, the 
steady-state price markup is a strictly decreasing function of steady-state inflation: 
Equation 50 






















Thus, the long-run Phillips curve is not vertical (fixed N̅ ) but upward sloping 
 
2. RBC and NK DSGE models with labor hours as proxy for labor supply 
In these models we will see how productivity or other shock are affecting labor supply. Standard 
business cycle model is very close to the canonical neo-classical growth model, this is extend 
the set-up with several real rigidities taken from Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters 
(2003, 2007) which aim at enhancing the empirical relevance of macro-models.In this RBC 
model economy is populated by a large number of households 𝑗 ∈ [0,1],the utility function of 















Where 𝜎𝑐 is the risk aversion, and 𝜎𝐿 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply1. 𝓊(. ) represents 
the utility increasing from consumption 𝑐𝑡(𝑗) ,and decreasing from hours worked ℎ𝑡(𝑗) . 
Welfare is the sum fo current and expected utilities:𝓌𝑡(𝑗) = ∑ 𝛽
𝜏+∞
𝜏=𝑜 𝓊(𝑐𝑡+𝜏(𝑗), ℎ𝑡+𝜏(𝑗)). 
Additionally, the production function follows a Cobb-Douglas technology: 
                                                          
1 The Frisch elasticity measures the relative change of working hours to a one-percent increase in real wage, given 
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𝐴 ∼ 𝒩(0, 𝜎𝐴,𝑡
2 )is an IID exogenous disturbance associated with a productivity shock. 
The resources constraint is given by the demand from households and authorities and it is equal 




𝐺  is a IDD normal shock,?̅? is the steady-state level of GDP, and 
𝑔𝑦 is the spending to GDP ratio. Basic parameters for RBC model are:𝛼 = 0.36 (capital factor); 
𝛽 = 0,99, 𝑔𝑦 = 0,2 ; 𝜎𝑐 = 2.5 ; 𝜎𝐿 = 0.5. 
Figure 2  Basic RBC DSGE mode  with productivity shock 𝑉𝐶(1,1)  =  0.012; 
 
Figure 3 Basic RBC DSGE mode  with spending shock 𝑉𝐶(2,2)  =  0.012; 
 
Variance covariance matrix for shocks, for productivity shock 𝑉𝐶(1,1)  =  0.012 and for 
spending shock 𝑉𝐶(2,1)  =  0.012.So in the fig.2 as production falls, real interest rate rises, 
same with labor hours or labor supply. Since the productivity shock many workers are 
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unemployed. Also, real wage decreases with consumption decreasing also. Real interest rate 
here may be causing productivity fall, and downward real wage. However, with government 
spending shock(endogenous), productivity increases, also real wage is rising. While the real 
interest rate is failing. Now, the New-Keynesian model assumes that monopolistic competitive 
firms are price makers on the good market, but they cannot adjust prices as prices are sticky. 
For the price setting of this firms, see Calvo (1983). There is a continuum of monopolistic firms 
𝑖 ∈ [0,1] ,that are choosing price 𝑃𝑝𝑡
∗ (𝑖). Among this firms a fraction 𝑝  is not a price setter, 
then the price remains the same 𝑝𝑡
∗(𝑖) = 𝑝𝑡−1
∗ (𝑗) .For the share of the firms 1 − 𝑝 allowed to 










The FOC from the previous problem, combined with the aggregate price equation and taken in 
logs gives rise to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve : 
Equation 55 
?̂?𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡?̂?𝑡+1 +
(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝛽 𝑝)
𝑝
(𝑚𝑐𝑡̂ − ?̂?𝑡)  
Where 𝑚𝑐𝑡̂ − ?̂?𝑡 are the marginal costs of the firms adjusted for inflation or additional real 
resources firms must spend to produce extra unit of output. Also, monetary authority controls 
the nominal interest rates and is concerned by both price and GDP growth. The monetary policy 
rule à la Taylor in logs it is: 
𝑟?̂? = 𝜌
𝑅 ?̂?𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝜌
𝑅)(𝜙𝑟 ?̂?𝑡 + 𝜙𝑦(?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡−1) 
Parameters in the NK DSGE model are : 𝛼 = 0.23 which is the share of capital in output,𝛽 =
0.99 which is a discount factor,𝛿 = 0.025 representing depreciation of capital,𝜎𝑐 = 1 is a 
risk aversion consumption, 𝜎𝐿 = 2 is a labor disutility,𝑔𝑦 = 0.2 is a public spending to 
GDP.New Keynesian parameter are : 
• 𝑝 = 0.75 -it’s a New-Keynesian Philips curve forward term; 
• 𝜖𝑝 = 10 -it’s a mark-up on prices substitutability;  
• 𝜌𝑅 = 0.7 -monetary policy smoothing parameter; 
• 𝜙𝑦 = 0.025 -monetary policy GDP growth target; 
• 𝜙𝑟 = 1.5 -monetary policy inflation growth target; 
 
Next is estimated NK DSGE model with three different shocks: First figure depicts productivity 
shock, next second figure depicts NK DSGE model with spending shock, in the third model 
there is New Keynesian model with interest rate shock. These figures are depicting the 
movement of real variables such as: output, consumption, investment, real wage and labor 
hours, also policy variables such as: real interest rate and inflation rate.  
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Figure 4 New -Keynesian DSGE model with productivity shock 𝑉𝐶(1,1)  =  0.012 
 
Figure 5 New -Keynesian DSGE model with spending shock  𝑉𝐶(2,2)  =  0.012 ; 
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Figure 6 New -Keynesian DSGE model with interest rate  shock   VC(3,3) = 0.01^2; 
 
As it can be seen from the three NK models above standard reply to: productivity shock, and 
spending shock is the fall of interest rate induced by the monetary policy. The effects of the 
interest rate shock on the other side it can be seen that have not much effect on real variables 
except for consumption. Supply of labor as measured by the labor hours it can be see that is 
decreasing in case of the productivity shock, and government spending shock. Whilst in the 
case of interest rate shock it is relatively stable with upwards linear trend. 
Conclusion 
 
Previous presented models in this paper theoretical and empirical, have tried their best to 
explain what Diamond (2011) wrote in defense of his qualifications that were questioned by 
the Republican politicians for him taking a post as Federal reserve’s chair ,…”that analysis of 
the labor market is in fact central to monetary policy”. Theoretical models such as by Akerlof 
(1985), that explained that near rational behavior of some firms causes directly unemployment 
and a loss of output just confirms how labor market and monetary policy are dependent. Social 
norms also matter such norm as we have seen from Akerlof (1980) model was how we trade 
labor for capital. These norms are all possibility for multiple equilibria case of which only one 
equilibrium is neo-classical, but others are possible too. Fairness seems to play its role in price 
stickiness, and expectations play crucial role in determining economic activity from which level 
of employment or unemployment depends. Thus, in our view this macroeconomics that is 
concerned with monetary policy effectiveness, unemployment, notion of fairness, is basically 
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